- Edited
- The Orion FAQ claims that other browsers offer only an illusion of privacy, but Orion itself (alongside Firefox, Chrome, Brave, so on...) offer no tangible protection against rogue/malicious extensions.
- Widely used and trusted (at the time) extensions have gone rogue before, Stylish for example, started data collecting for every page accessed, to then sell that data to advertisers and "public data" collectors. Others like Nano Defender, used the data for themselves to hijack logins.
Read "Why Johnny can't tell if he is compromised" by Thomas Dullien, the points it makes gets across quick and easy; this is the rationale these suggestions revolve around. The underlying purpose of these suggestions: to lessen the issue of an inherent lack of trust within extensions, by shifting some of the trust to the user of the Orion browser.
The suggestions:
- 1. The permission system for extensions
- Prompting the same way macOS does for sensitive permissions is likely easiest for users, beyond that I don't know what to suggest.
- 2. Have a rogue extension blacklist as a supplement to the extension permission system; all extensions must be verified by this in order to install, with the option to override this being intentionally cumbersome (macOS's Gatekeeper does this for unknown Applications). By cumbersome, I'm thinking of replicating how macOS has you open Security & Privacy to allow a system extension; Orion would tell you where this is, maybe even open to it.
- If an internet connection cannot be established to verify the extension signatures, Orion would state this situation and not allow installation of that extension.
- Idea being to not entirely trust Orion's extension permission system, as it being bypassed is a possibility.
- This also prevents some user error that the less tech literate would be susceptible to committing, given they attempt installing a blacklisted (rogue) extension.
- 3. Provide the tools to tell if an extension is rogue.
- Log as much as possible that's important, with each event timestamped. Domains and IPs (alongside ASNs if it helps) would be a good start, as that's what I've seen rogue extensions require (when they actually don't need this). Hopefully the logging can also catch a rogue extension escaping to the internet through hijacking a different installed extension.
- This should be an easy to learn (and use) feature by default, but not restricted enough to be security theatre.